Theology or Social Science?

The Theoretical Basis for Christian Education

‘Theology or Social Science’ is an article I wrote in 1984 in response to what was then an ongoing discussion in the field of Christian education in the United States about the proper basis for the discipline. One of the most important developments of the period since has been the growth of practical theology, of which Christian education is a branch. The development of practical theology has led to an implicit acceptance of the use of social science in theology; this is seen most clearly in the pastoral cycle, of which one stage consists in drawing on the insights of the social sciences to analyse a situation.¹

Despite implicit acceptance of their value in practical theology, I have nowhere seen an explicit justification for the use of the social sciences, and in particular an investigation of the relation between theology and social science of the kind I give here. In the article, I argue for the convergence of the ‘theological’ and ‘social science’ approaches; of the necessity of partnership between the two; and against the attempt by proponents of either position to exclude the other. I do this by creating a framework within which the relationship of theology to the social sciences may be understood.

Christian education is in the throes of a crisis of identity. One collection of articles on the discipline and methods of Christian education is entitled, Who are We?² Seymour and Miller’s book, Contemporary Approaches to Christian Education, lists five separate approaches, each with contrasting understandings of scope, aims and methods.³ Underlying these differences of approach is a single basic question. Christian education is a religious undertaking, and as such needs to be informed by theology. Christian education is a form of education, which has its own body of theory, in which the social sciences play a major role. In Christian education, the practices of education and theology meet. Yet what is to be the relationship between them? Is Christian education simply a particular variety of education, or is it a branch
of practical or pastoral theology? Which is to be the dominant or foundational ‘macrotheory’ for Christian education, theology or the social sciences?

Not all writers, of course, accept the issue in these terms. For Thomas Groome, the relationship between theology and his praxis methodology is one of dialogue, a ‘two-way street’ which ‘holds theoria and praxis in a dialectical unity’.\(^4\) James Fowler takes the concept of faith, giving it a particular theological significance as a ‘human universal’, and then attempts to understand it from a social and psychological point of view.\(^5\) The one unites the two disciplines in the context of a particular method, the other through a particular concept of religious education’s aim. Others, however, accept the issue as an either/or and come down on one side or the other. It is to a resolution of this dichotomy that this paper is addressed.

On one side of the debate are those for whom Christian education is primarily a theological discipline, those for whom it is theology which, in the words of Randolph Crump Miller, provides the ‘clue’ to Christian education. In the book of that title, published in 1950, he wrote:

> The centre of the curriculum is a two-fold relationship between God and the learner. The curriculum is both God-centred and experience-centred. Theology must be prior to the curriculum! Theology is ‘truth-about-God-in-relation-to-man’.\(^6\)

Thirty years later, concluding a chapter on educational philosophy, Miller wrote that since ‘Christian education deals with the data of common experience’:

> the problem is to work out some coherent unity for our belief system. Thus, Christian education comes back to theology for its primary content and its organising principle.\(^7\)

Miller advocates the priority of theology first because theology supplies the ‘primary content’ of Christian education, the Christian belief-system. Secondly, he claims, theology supplies the requisite understanding of the learner, as a person in a particular relationship with God.\(^8\) Thirdly, theology provides an account of the context for Christian education, as part of the church’s pastoral ministry. And finally, theology judges the methods of Christian education. In the words of John Westerhoff, ‘our theological presuppositions provide the screen for understanding both theory and practice’.\(^9\)
On the other hand a number of writers look to educational theory for their basic models in Christian education. Leon McKenzie begins The Religious Education of Adults with an attack on the ‘conventional wisdom’ of the ‘theological’ school.\(^\text{10}\) Perhaps the most outspoken of these authors is James Michael Lee, whose trilogy outlining his ‘macro-theory’ of ‘Religious Instruction’ has the sub-title A Social Science Approach.\(^\text{11}\) Against the theological approach Lee and McKenzie bring a number of substantial criticisms. First, in Lee’s words, ‘Religion is learned in the way the learner learns and not after the manner of its own existence.’\(^\text{12}\) In other words, the religious teacher must start where the learner is: must take full account of his or her past experience and existing understanding of religion and the religious life. Areas of content will be chosen not according to the way they cohere in a particular theological framework but according to the needs and capacity of the learner. Neglect of this principle, they argue, leads to a concept of Christian education as the transmission of authoritative content, and the characterization of the learner as an empty vessel for whom Christian education will consist of the passive reception of a theologically defined belief system. ‘In too many places’, writes McKenzie,

> teaching is apprised as authoritative telling; learning is equated with listening and accepting. The faith-process becomes the receiving of a cultural hand-me-down and not the wrestling with Jacob’s angel that leads to authentic commitment.\(^\text{13}\)

Acceptance of the principle that learning involves the active participation of the learner commits the teacher to the attempt to understand the way the learner learns. This is an area of investigation which lies within the purview of the social sciences. There is no theological theory of educational method; like farming or child-care it is simply an area of common human understanding.

These, then are the extreme positions on the relation of theology and social science to Christian education. But even the literature of each indicates that neither is satisfactory. Take, for example, the way the theological side deals with educational techniques. In one of the essays collected in The Theory of Christian Education Practice, Miller asserts: ‘The techniques will pretty much take care of themselves once we grasp the fundamental theological significance of what we are doing.’ But in the following chapter he gives a sympathetic account of educational philosophy and concludes: ‘Christian education in most ways is like secular education.’\(^\text{14}\) In the
discussion which follows on the role of the Bible in Christian education, Miller is heavily dependent on the psychology of development in deciding whether and how the Bible can be taught to young children. Westerhoff, despite his assertion that theology is the theoretical basis for Christian education, builds his own strategy around the concept of enculturation, which is drawn from the social sciences. Despite his disapproval of ‘schooling’ on account of its secularity, examples of educational techniques abound in Westerhoff’s work.

On the other side, the ‘social science approach’ is founded on certain theological presuppositions. In particular it requires a theology of immanence, a vigorous assertion that God works in and through his creation and not simply in a supernatural way by what Lee calls ‘proximate zaps’ of the Holy Spirit. In writings on both sides of the debate, genuine insights and valid criticisms jostle together with oversimplification and inaccuracy. Some resolution of the dichotomy is clearly required.

The Structure of Science

In the foregoing review of the literature the argument between the ‘theological’ and ‘social science’ approaches has contrasted the relation of theology to education on the one hand and the relation between social science and education on the other. What I intend to do in what follows is to leave the practice of education out of account for the time being and to enquire directly into the relationship between theology and the social sciences. In order to do so, however, it will be necessary first to look at the natural sciences and their relationship to philosophy.

The progress of science has two complementary aspects: the discovery of new facts and the clarification of concepts. In the course of scientific progress these two aspects go hand in hand: the discovery of a set of new facts calls forth an explanation of these facts by means of concepts whilst the elaboration of new ideas stimulates the search for new facts. Philosopher Stephen Toulmin points out the danger that the scientist, and indeed the casual observer of science, may fall into one of two opposing errors, which he calls the Baconian and the Cartesian error, after the seventeenth century scientist Francis Bacon and the philosopher Rene Descartes. The Baconian error proceeds from the obvious fact that there can be no science without phenomena to the conclusion that the ‘proper’ way of doing science – the essence of research – is the
collection of new facts. The opposite, Cartesian, error moves from the premise that science requires concepts to explain its discoveries to the conclusion that what the scientist is really doing is working out the implications of a few basic logical principles, a process more akin to philosophy than to science. An interesting example of this error was Eddington’s claim that the theory of relativity was, in fact, independent of observation, and could have been deduced from first principles.

Both these oversimplifications reflect the same basic error, that of positivism: the belief that we have access to the facts simply by observation. Of course, this theory concedes, our powers of observation are greatly enhanced by various technological aids. Astronomical telescopes, microscopes, X-rays and so on all help us to see better, and in the social sciences, techniques of research and experiment design make us more accurate in our observation. But the assumption is that all that is needed in order to do science is first to observe the facts and then to explain them. However, this is a grave error: we do not see first and then think; first observe and then explain. In practice, we need concepts before we can observe. Like the infant, the scientist is an initiate into a new world. Much of his or her training consists in learning to see what other scientists see. This requires taking for granted not only the technology behind the various aids to observation, but also the conceptual frameworks within which the observations are to be interpreted. A doctor looking at an X-ray, a physicist into a cloud chamber, or a social scientist analysing the data from a set of questionnaires all ‘see’ more than the lay observer because of the conceptual frameworks of explanation which they have learned as a result of their training. In the words of N. R. Hanson, all data is ‘theory-laden’.20 There is no neutral standpoint from which all the facts appear, ‘value-free’, no privileged level of observation ‘uncontaminated’ by a given theoretical framework. To accept a given fact as significant involves the acceptance of a whole framework within which its significance is explained and by which it is related to all the other relevant facts.21

Yet science is not generally thought of as a field in which anything goes, in which one person’s interpretation is as good as any others. One of the most impressive features about the scientific community is its unity: not only its unity of purpose, but the unity of its interpretation. Scientific data is public, its observations replicable, quantifiable, empirical, ‘objective’ and, supposedly, ‘value-free’. One scientist can request the results of another’s experiment for independent analysis. One scientist can build on
the other’s results; science progresses by taking as certain the results of previous series of experiments, by establishing reliably-tested laws and axioms. But this objectivity is achieved by members of the scientific community through the acceptance of a shared conceptual framework, or paradigm. For scientists who share a particular paradigm, every term and every observation has a definable public, quantifiable, ‘objective’ meaning. When Einstein proposed his theory of relativity, part of what he was proposing was that many of the most important terms in physics, such as force, mass and velocity, should be understood in a different way. For this theory to be accepted, it had to cease to be simply Einstein’s theory and become the generally accepted ‘language’ of physicists. Acceptance of a scientific paradigm is a more thoroughgoing and methodologically demanding example of what we all do all the time in order to communicate with one another. No one can be a Humpty Dumpty, for whom words mean whatever he wants them to mean. The reason we understand one another is that we all share a common framework of agreement about meaning.

The effect of this understanding of science is to rule out the old style positivist or inductivist understanding of the relation between fact and theory. There are no pure observations, and no value-free facts from which theories are built up simply by a process of induction; something must always be taken for granted. According to Sir Karl Popper, the investigation of a scientific theory always terminates at a collective decision to accept some basic statement as a valid description of reality. These basic statements of scientific consensus are like ‘piles driven into a swamp’. They do not reach the solid bottom of indisputable fact, but are sufficient for the time being to support the structure. But if empirical observation is dependent on theoretical frameworks, conceptual analysis is similarly dependent on empirical observations. Science does not simply proceed by deduction from first principles. There is no axiom that can be taken with confidence as the ‘rock bottom’ from which deduction may begin. Rather, a scientific theory is a ‘model’: a best possible approximation. The task for the scientist is to discover by experiment and analysis how far the particular model is an accurate description of reality.

We are now in a position to attempt a preliminary conclusion about the relationship between science and philosophy as a first step in the attempt to sketch out an understanding of the relationship between social science and theology. Science and philosophy are to understood as interdependent. Science is primarily the work of
empirical investigation. It is what takes place within a given paradigm or conceptual framework. Philosophy is primarily the work of conceptual analysis. It is what takes place when the theoretical framework is in the process of revision. The scientist works within a conceptual framework, the analysis of which for coherence and logical implication is the work of the philosopher. On the other hand, the logical systems and conceptual frameworks of philosophy cannot be isolated from reality. So long as philosophy is an attempt to describe the world we live in philosophers must make empirical statements, which are in principle open to scientific investigation and possible refutation.

**Theology and Social Science**

To turn from the analysis of the natural sciences to that of the social sciences is to introduce additional levels of complication. In the first place, the social scientist is attempting to explain the behaviour not of the natural world but of people. Unlike the phenomena of the natural world, from electrons through to animals, people are not simply the passive objects of observation. People can answer back! They have their own frameworks of explanation, their own ways of understanding their own behaviour.

There are some extremely influential schools of social science in which people’s own explanations for their actions are treated as unimportant. According to these, a truly scientific explanation of behaviour requires that we take a detached point of view. In behaviourism, for example, it is axiomatic that any statement about the mind, such as one which includes a concept such as ‘thinking’, ‘expecting’, ‘desiring’ or ‘hoping’, must be treated as unscientific, since these are explanations people give for their own actions, which are not open to scientific observation. All such statements are to translated into a ‘neutral’, ‘objective’ observation-language. But assumptions such as these depend on the positivist ideal of science, which we have already shown to be mistaken. In practice, peoples’ everyday explanations for what they do cannot be ignored. The explanation of human behaviour is a hermeneutical exercise. It consists not simply of the attempt to test one given framework of explanation, that of the scientist, against observed events; but involves interaction between the scientists’ explanation and the various common-sense, everyday explanations of the people under observation.
Nor do the complications end here. People’s explanations and understandings of their own behaviour typically arise in a given cultural context. They depend on shared frameworks of understanding, which may be implicit in the institutions of a given society. What people actually say and believe about their own individual actions is, therefore, only part of the story. What people are able to say they believe rests on a deeper level: that of what they, in common with most others in their society, simply assume to be true. This basic level of intersubjective agreement, without which society itself could not exist, includes the social scientist, who is also a member of a society, and whose assumptions themselves arise within the society of which he or she is a member.

Implicit in the frameworks of social scientists are certain ‘images of humanity’. These function as the fundamental model or analogy, the governing paradigm of the particular school of social science. The ‘image’ in behaviourism has been called ‘man as the sophisticated rat’. In the new and growing field of cognitive science the model is of people as ‘information processors’; in social psychology ‘actors’. But social science differs from the natural sciences in that the social scientist is not simply an external observer. He or she is a member of society, whose assumptions are in dialogue with the people under observation. The social scientist brings forward certain ‘image of humanity’ as frameworks for interpreting a society or social phenomenon. But within that society is an implicit foundation of intersubjective understanding, and this too consists of an ‘image of humanity’: in the words of Charles Taylor, a particular definition of ‘man, the human motivation, the human condition’, a particular ‘vision of the agent and his society’. Thus, while in the natural sciences the theoretical framework can be ‘bracketed’ or taken for granted for the purposes of empirical investigation, in the social sciences certain implicit understandings of the human condition are internal to the investigation. Thus, in a social scientific investigation there is an implicit dialogue between paradigms or frameworks of interpretation. The social scientist is required to do both science and philosophy at the same time, a combination which lies at the heart of a genuine hermeneutical method.

Thus, it is impossible to accept the claim at the heart of the ‘social science’ approach as advocated by Lee, that social science is ‘value-free’. The ‘public’ nature of social science and the ‘objectivity’ of its results depends on the acceptance of a given paradigm. Educational research is implicitly governed by an image of the teacher and
the learner. This image does not arise simply from the facts; it is part of the researchers’ paradigm. The decision to reject a certain school of social science, such as behaviourism, on theological grounds will not be made primarily because it is deemed ethically wrong to treat people as programmable automata or animals, but for the much more fundamental reason that behaviourism’s ‘image of humanity’ is incompatible with almost any theologically acceptable belief about the nature and status of human beings.

What I have sought to demonstrate is that every field of study is conceptually linked to each of the others. The natural sciences and philosophy are, by their nature, in dialogue. Empirical research is carried on within a framework of concepts, whose analysis is the province of philosophy. Social science, on the other hand, embraces both sides of the dialogue. It partakes of the nature of both science and philosophy. Its empirical work must be carried on against the background of continuous conceptual analysis and reappraisal, of ongoing dialogue between the scientists’ explanations and those of the society in which the research is being carried out. Theology enters the situation as a partner in the dialogue. In relation to social science, its point of entry is anthropology. The fundamental models of the social sciences are certain ‘images of humanity’, whose applicability is a subject of both empirical investigation and philosophical discussion. Theology criticizes these images and brings its own into the conversation, models such as ‘man in revolt’,29 or ‘humanity-in-relation-to-God’. These images offer potentially greater explanatory power over a wider range of experience than do those proposed by the social scientist. This is not to deny the applicability of the images of social science. The idea of people as ‘actors’ or ‘information processors’ may be valid within the limits of their own sphere, whether social relationships or cognitive functioning. The images or paradigms offered by theology should have a wider field of significance: they should aim to uncover more fundamental truths about humanity in the world and in relation to God. Moreover, their source lies in the activity of theology as a whole and draws on the enquiry into the nature of God and the revelation we have received in Jesus Christ. But (I wrote in 1984) the task of applying theological statements about mankind to experience, of selecting and appraising the evidence by which such statements are to be validated, is the task of the social scientist – albeit a theologically-aware social scientist. Perhaps it is because this task has not been recognized that (up to that point) the justification of
theological understandings of the human condition tends to be overwhelmingly anecdotal and prescriptive. Since then, there has been a significant increase in the number of theologians conversant with the social sciences and increasing recognition of their role in practical theology.

**The Image of the Learner**

If theology and social science meet over their respective images of human life it is with respect to the image of the learner that the theological and social science approaches come together. The basic difference between the two approaches is that one tends to see the position of the learner from the point of view of theology, the other from the point of view of social science. For Miller, for example, it is the fact that the learner is in relation with God which guarantees the legitimacy of the theological approach. Theology provides the learner’s authentic self-understanding, a sinner in need of reconciliation. Theology defines the dynamic of the ‘I-Thou’ situation in which the learner is involved. Theology specifies the need for teaching techniques to be learner-centred.30

However empirically grounded the studies of social scientists might be, these representatives of the ‘theological approach’ see them as irrelevant to theology: once the learner is designated a sinner, or a ‘person-in-relation-to-God’, knowledge of the learner as a member of the human race becomes unimportant. The result is a complete inability to specify the relationship between learning, which is a feature of all human beings, and revelation, which lies at the heart of religious learning. Thus religious learning is separated from everyday learning and becomes a separate process altogether – in Westerhoff’s terms a process of ‘conversion’ which is unpredictable, not open to investigation.31 ‘Faith,’ declares Westerhoff, ‘cannot be taught.’32 Miller speaks for a large body of opinion when he writes:

> The process [of Christian growth] cannot be guaranteed by the processes of education or evangelism or by the relevance of theological concepts. The response … is in the last analysis a personal decision that rests in the mystery of God.33

The dogmatic assumption that knowledge of effective methods is powerless in the field of religious learning leads to a denigration of the value of social science and a lack of concern for its relation to theology.
For Lee, on the other hand, ‘Religion is learned according to the way the learner learns and not after the manner of its own existence.’ It is the learner as learner which is the relevant anthropology for religious instruction, and an understanding of how the learner learns is derived from the social sciences, not from theology. Just because, for a theologian, learning has certain theological presuppositions, this does not make the study of learning a branch of theology any more than farming of childcare, which also have theological presuppositions. But this position requires more than empirical validation if it is to become operative in Christian education. It requires incorporation in a theological understanding of the learner. And this, in fact, is what Lee does. The statement that religion is learned naturally, the way the learner learns, is dependent on the belief that natural ways of learning are not supernaturally overridden. The requirement that the work of the Holy Spirit and the influence of the faith community becomes a specifiable environmental influence is based on the belief that the Holy Spirit works within and not outside the laws of nature. The ‘social science approach’ is not independent of theology. On the contrary, it is a particular type of theological approach, based on a theology of immanence.

In this respect, moreover the social science approach is clearly a more adequate theological statement than much of what lies behind the theological approach, since it includes a well developed conception of God’s work in and through the conditions of creation. There is a close relation between the social science criticism of the appeal to the Holy Spirit as a variable or ‘primary proximate cause’ in the process of Christian learning, and Horace Bushnell’s protest against the supernaturalism of nineteenth century revivalism which allowed no place for ‘the organic powers God has constituted as vehicles of grace’. A theology which ignores creation, which begins with the image of people as sinners in need of grace rather than as created human beings sharing a common human nature, is clearly inadequate not simply for Christian education, but as theology. It is a theology guilty of ‘imperialism’: proposing solutions in an area beyond its capacity and with an ill-grounded authoritarianism.

However, once it is realised that science, an in particular social science, is not isolated but in dialogue with theology, the way is open for the incorporation of both the methods and the insights of social science into an overall theological perspective, which is precisely what is taking place in practical theology. It is to be hoped that a proper appreciation of the respective roles of theology and social science will render
the controversy between the ‘theological’ and ‘social science’ approaches obsolete. The way forward for Christian education is already indicated, I suggest, in an article by D. Campbell Wyckoff, first published as long ago as 1967. Wyckoff claims, from within the theological approach, that ‘Christian education as a discipline is an enquiry into teaching and learning as modes and means of response to revelation’. But Wyckoff does not thereby dismiss the various contributory disciplines in the field of education as irrelevant. He recognizes the interdisciplinary nature, not only of education, but of Christian education. ‘Religious education,’ he writes, ‘belongs to the context of a total education.’


12 Lee, *Flow*, p.58

13 McKenzie, *Adults*, p.11

14 Miller, *Theory*, pp 160-179

15 *op. cit*, pp 202-205


20 N. R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*, Cambridge University Press, 1958, pp 1-30


29 The title of a book by Emil Brunner, Lutterworth, 1939

30 Miller, *Theory*, pp 156-164

31 Westerhoff, *Inner Growth, Outer Change*, pp 20-23


33 Miller, *Theory*, p 162

34 Lee, *Flow*, p 58

35 Lee, Authentic source’, pp 124-125, criticizing Miller

36 Lee, ‘Authentic source’, pp 128-142


38 D. C. Wyckhoff, ‘Religious Education as a Discipline’, in Westerhoff (ed), *Who Are We?* pp 173, 177